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1. Introduction 
The 2008 global economic crisis exposed the importance of  
state fiscal intervention, and more than two decades of neoclassic paradigm and a non-fiscal 
domination paradigm, it brought back fiscal activism and the Keynesian ideas and measures at 
the top of government agendas. However, drastic worsening of many developed nations’ fiscal 
state, as a result of a decreased economic activityand of various fiscal packages aimed at the 
financial sector and the economy as a whole, complemented by budgetary pressures from an 
aging population, activated debates on the size, sustainability and the consequences of budget 
deficits and public dept. 
Recent events, particularly the conditions created by the European debt crisis under which, 
some EU member states faced difficulties in access to markets, confirmed that the challenges of 
fiscal sustainability are not only long-term, and are not typical only of developing countries, but 
are a real problem for developed countries with a growing public debt, stagnant economic 
growth, unfavorable demographic trends and obligations passed on by the financial sector. This 
imposed the sustainability of public finances (important for the creation of sufficient fiscal space 
to tackle future unfavorable macroeconomic shocks and with costs associated with an aging 
population) as one of the most important macroeconomic subjects for EU member states and 
candidates, according to its importance in maintaining EU’s stability. 
 The subject of fiscal sustainability is relevant for the Republic of Macedonia which has a 
relatively low but growing level of public debt, that from the beginning of the crisis until 
December 2015 grew more than 20pp of GDP and reached 46.5% of GDP (38% of GDP state 
debt). Estimation of fiscal sustainability is an infallible part of analysis carried out by 
international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) in countries of interest, including 
Macedonia.This is particularly important taking into account the growth tempo of Macedonia’s 
2 
debt, its structure, and efficiency of fiscal politics, one of the key indicators for assessment of our 
stability on the path towards the EU. 
 In context of the above, this paper defines the concept of fiscal sustainability, presents the 
problem’s relevance for developed countries of the European debt crisis case, and lastly, 
elaborates Macedonia’s fiscal politics, public debt, and fiscal sustainability. 
 
2. Concept of fiscal sustainability  
Often times when fiscal sustainability is mentioned, it is about the country’s solvency. In that 
sense, fiscal sustainability
1
 can be defined as the country’s ability (theoretically) of indefinitely 
maintaining current fiscal politics without the need of changes in public spending or taxation, in 
order to influence the primary budget balance; and such a policy can be maintained indefinitely 
without continuous growth and excessive debt accumulation(EC, 2015; IMF, 2009; Greene, 
2012).It follows that a continuous growing and/or extremely high coefficient of debt is 
unsustainable (Balassone et al., 2009;Afonso, 2005). Theoretically, the concept of sustainability 
is often linked with satisfying the interim budget limitation according to which the total of the 
current value of primary budget surpluses has to be at least equal to the initial debt (Chalk and 
Hemming, 2000; IMF, 2002). In the case of EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact, according to 
Balassone and Franco (Balassone and Franco, 2000), sustainability can be seen as “the non-
breaking of arbitrary predefined parametric standards” 
Fiscal unsustainability implies that the existing fiscal policies cannot continue indefinitely 
and, sooner or later, adaption will be necessary. Otherwise, public debt will explode (Cottarelli, 
2012). Usually, the later determined unsustainability and necessary adaptation are very costly due 
to the loss of trust among participants in the financial markets. Thus, the focus of fiscal 
sustainability analysis is often times on the consequences from the required changes in policies. 
 
2. Why fiscal sustainability on the path towards the EU – The European debt crisis 
The fiscal stimuli as a response to the global financial and economic crisis caused a 
serious problem for the Eurozone and many countries infringed on the established Maastricht 
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Fiscal sustainability had been discussed long ago and it is intuitively clear that a policy is sustainable when it 
prevents bankruptcy, but there is no clear and widely-accepted analytical and operative definition on whatconstitutes 
the sustainable position of debt (review of definitions inBalassone and Franco, 2000). 
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Economic growth disappointed in the EMU. The Eurozone barely achieved growth in 
2008, and entered a recession in 2009 with a fall of GDP of 4.4%. However, the European debt 
crisis is caused by other factors as well: a lack of common fiscal policy; great disparities in the 
level of development among countries from the center and the periphery; great financial 
instability in some countries; disagreements among member states about the direction of fiscal 
policies, etc. (Fiti and Tashevska, 2013).  
EMU is the only example in the world of the existence of a common monetary region but 
without a common fiscal policy, banking union and political union (Balassone et al., 2009; Lane 
2012). The Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have been established in 
order to discipline fiscal governments of member states and were meant to serve as a replacement 
for a common fiscal policy in the EMU. However, without efficient control over public spending 
in some EMU countries, fiscal rules weren’t followed(Fiti and Tashevska, 2013). Budgetary 
discipline in a monetary union is very important since fiscal expansion of an undisciplined 
country causes negative externalities in other countries in the zone, while the absence of a central 
fiscal organ creates conditions for the existence of a moral hazard and chronic deficit in certain 
countries. The possibility for countries to borrow in a common currency causes problems of a 
free ride until there are incentives to save heavily indebted countries. The crisis confirms that the 
existence of a monetary union without a common fiscal policy is unsustainable (Bosomworth, 
2012). These are some of the reasons why it is important to devote attention to mechanisms that 
sustain the stability of public finances in each country that aspires to join the EU and which will 
have a share in the stabilisation/destabilisation of the macroeconomic environment in the Union. 
The seriousness of the crisis in the Eurozone caused disrespect of SGP’s clause according 
to which problematic countries should not be bailed out. Greece was the first to receive a bailout 
package from the EU and the IMF in May 2010, followed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and 
Cyprus. The ECB took unconventional monetary measures of support for the European system, 
such as the buying of public debt of problematic countries. Later, a set of measures and activities 
were taken: the EU and the IMF formed a European mechanism of financial stability to aid 
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European countries were exposed to various reasons for debt growth: some had a traditionally high public debt – 
Greece, Portugal and Italy, while in some, the aid for private and the banking debt led to rising public debt – Spain 
and Ireland(Semmler and Semmler 2013, Fiti and Tashevska, 2013). 
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problematic countries. The countries agreed a Europact, a European semester (a timetable for all 
monitoring elements, including fiscal, macroeconomic and structural policies), signed a New 
Fiscal Compact as part of the Stability, Coordination and Stability Treaty with the EMU, etc. 
Pressed by fiscal rules and the pressure of financial markets, European countries took on fiscal 
contraction during conditions of deep negative production gaps.Some authors are against the 
implemented fiscal consolidation i.e. a fiscal austerity policy during conditions of recession, 
warning that it can cause nervousness in financial markets, added by its restrictive effect on the 
GDP that can reduce the deficit reduction, even cause the debt coefficient to rise if the beginning 
debt level and fiscal multiplicators are high, and the real time for consolidation is the boom and 
not the fall(example. Krugman, 2010; Cafiso and Celini 2012; DeLong and Summers, 2012). 
The European Commission’s report (EC, 2015) on the EU’s fiscal sustainability, states 
that current conditions of low inflations and modest growth of the realistic GDP (1.9% in 2015) 
hinder the debt reduction, and fiscal consolidation is required, mainly by cutting unproductive 
public spending and increasing efficiency of public expenditure. Low interest rates lower debt 
service costs and facilitate the reduction of debt burden. Despite lowered risks to fiscal 
sustainability regarding the beginning of the crisis, there are serious mid-term and long-term 
challenges, mainly due to the high amount of accumulated debt and projected growth of costs 
associated with an aging population. 
 
4. Fiscal policy, public debt and fiscal sustainability in the Republic of Macedonia 
Before the Global crisis, the Republic of Macedonia was characterized by stable growth 
rates (ave. 5% in 2004-2008); reduced unemployment; soft inflation and deflation rates in 2004 (-
0.4%) and in 2009 (-0.8%); an almost balanced budget (a surplus in 2004, 2005 and 2007); 
modest public debt (reduced public debt of just 23% of GDP in 2008); a significant level of 
international reserves; a small and well-capitalized banking system with limited dependency on 
external financing, and more on home deposits which reduced exposure to global financial 
conditions; positive signals for potential investors and business partners from progress on EU 
integration by becoming a candidate country; great deficit on the current account – the main 
vulnerable spot at the beginning of the crisis. 
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 The fiscal policy prior to the crisis was oriented toward the creation of conditions for higher 
economic growth though the stimulation of aggregative offer and demand: in 2007, legal reforms 
were passed which introduced flat tax; tax exemption was also introduced with an amount of 
reinvested profit; with GDP there was an introduction of a 5% tax on some products; in July 2008 
a measure was passed that saw the reduction of social benefits for 10 pp;
3
in 2005, Macedonia 
borrowed under favorable conditions from global capital markets by issuing the first Macedonian 
Eurobond used as repayment of capital to the London Club
4
. 
 Graph 1. Budget receipts, budgetexpenditures and balanced budgetof RM (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Macedonia, NBRM  
Budget revenues Budget balance 
Budget expenditures Primary budget balance 
Budget balance (right axis) Cyclic adjusted budget balance 
 Cyclic adjusted primary balance 
 
 
However, Macedonia was not immune to the crisis. As a small and open economy, it is especially 
vulnerable to external shocks from changes to economic activity in neighboring countries, 
particularly in EU countries as its main trade partners. Due to the insufficiently developed 
financial markets in the region and in Macedonia, the crisis arrived, first, through the real sector, 
through reduced demand for exports (for the crisis’ transmission see Trenovski, 2013; Fiti and 
Tashevska, 2013). 
 The fall of economic activity in the country was first felt with the reduction of budget 
revenues and the 2007 surplus (0.6% of GDP) turned into a deficit of -0.9% of GDP in 2008 and 
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The reduction of tax rates (however, a widening of tax ambit) and benefits payment rates, primarly increased public 
revenue as % of GDP (Trenovski, 2013). 
4
In2009 a new Eurobond was issued, but now under more unfavorable conditions –its interest rate was almost two 




of -0.3% of GDP (graph 1, right image). The fiscal impulse was around 3% of 
GDP. The expansive discreet fiscal policy implemented by the Government in 2009 (anti-crisis 
packages to facilitate the effects of the crisis, increasing potential growth of the economy, 
improving living standards, and protection for vulnerable groups), despite contributing to the 
limiting of the economic fall to just 0.4% in 2009, led to the deepening of the budget deficit, to a 
level of -2.7% of GDP in 2009, whilst the primary deficit reached -2.2% of GDP.It is logical 
during conditions of a fall in economic activity to implement fiscal stimuli, especially when the 
monetary policy has its hands tied (here due to the fixed exchange rate).The monetary policy was 
tightened in order to reduce the pressure on the foreign currency reserves.
6
 Most often, the fiscal 
and monetary policy act in the opposite direction as strategic substitutes, especially visible with 
the expansive fiscal policy, when the restrictive monetary policy neutralized a part of the 
stimulating effect (Bedjeti 2010; Trenovski, 2013; Trenovski and Tashevska, 2014). In 2010 the 
fiscal policy was aimed at the gradual tightening of the budget deficit mainly through the 
adaptation of public spending; however, in recent years, the budget deficit had deepened, 
reaching -4.2% in 2014 and 3.5% of GDP in 2015.
7
The 2011-2014 period is characterized, once 
again, by a structural deficit and positive fiscal impulse, indicating an expansive discreet fiscal 
policy, while in 2015, there is a negative fiscal impulse (see NBRM, 2016).The IMF (2015) 
expect the deficit to remain over 3% of GDP in the mid-term, should there be no changes in 
policy. 
Graph 2 Structure of public expenditures of the Republic of Macedonia (in %) 
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The primary balance is more appropriate when analyzing the current course of policy and when examining the 
efficiency of the discreet fiscal policy because it doesn’t include the interest rate costs which aren’t dependent on 
current decisions by the Government, but arise from previous obligations. 
6
The increased offer of state bonds to finance higher public expenditures and NBRM’s efforts to stop the growth of 
inflation encouraged growth of interest rates of MF and NBRM, and they reached the peak of 9% in mid-2009. 
7
This decrease is largely due to the increased public revenues, partially due to the reintroduction of non-reinvested 
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Source: MF and NBRM. 
 Macedonia’s public revenues are in a downward trend and are among the lowest in Europe in 
relation to the GDP. They were reduced from 33.8% of GDP in 2007 to 27.8% in 2014, among 
the lowest in the region due to lowered revenue tax rates and income tax rates, as well as social 
security benefits.
8
The relaxing of fiscal policies and fiscal stimuli increased public expenditures 
to 34.1% in 2008 and 34.2% in 2012 (31.8% in 2004). Despite the level of public expenditures 
not being worrying, their structure isn’t favorable to growth. Current expenditures make up 
around 90% of the total budget expenditures (graph 2). Social benefits have increased as a GDP 
percentage, and pension growth (they were 9% of GDP in 2015), together with the effects from 
an aging population and the outflow of young qualified workers will cause further pressure on the 
budget. The country carried out several successful pension reforms in the past two decades, 
however, they aren’t enough to prevent the growth of expenses. Doemelandet al (Doemeland et 
al., 2015)point out the low efficiency of public spending. The role of capital investments in the 
total budget expenditures increased to 10.1% in 2014 (14.4% in 2008). But they also carry many 
unproductive costs; while large sums of money end up abroad from where they have no 
multiplicative effect on the home economy. The research and development and education 
expenditures that support growth have a particularly low share in the total budget expenditures. 
 
 
4.1 Public debt 
 The 2000-2008 period is characterized by continuous decline of public debt from 47.9% 
of GDP to the lowest level of 23% of GDP in 2008, while the 2008 public debt was 20.5% of 
GDP (graph 3). Strong domestic demand, favorable lending conditions, helped the acceleration of 
economic activity. The correlation of the economic growth rates and public debt interest rates 
were sufficient, while a policy of fiscal discipline and primary balance (small surplus) was also 
carried out. The earnings from privatization, especially of ESM-distribution (225 million EUR in 
2006) also played a big part. In 2007 the debt to the Paris and the London Club was paid, parts of 
the debt to multilateral creditors, and two structural bonds.  
However, from 2008 the debt began to rise as a result of worsened economic conditions 
and the Government’s expansive fiscal policy. The country’s borrowing, especially from abroad, 
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Doemeland et al (Doemeland et al., 2015)point out that the policy of the SDI to intensify employment and growth, 
contributed to the decline of the correlation between revenues and GDP due to tax breaks.  
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became an important source of assets to cover public expenditures (the borrowing from abroad 
has increased from 1.1% in 2004 to 10.2% in 2013). In August 2014, Macedonia took out a 36.4-
million-euro loan for competition development policies, financed by the World Bank. In 2014 
public debt reached 45.9% because the Government issued a 500-million-euro bond under very 
favorable conditions (3.975%, 7 years) and thus completely, early financed the 15-million-euro 
bond, and carried out payments to the IMF in 2015 (154 million EUR). Public debt was reduced 
in the first half of 2015 to 43,7% of GDP. Nevertheless, the issuing of a new Eurobond of 270 
million euros and increased borrowing at home of 94 million euros caused the country’s debt to 
be 38% of GDP, while the total public debt 46.5% of GDP, which is an increase of 23.5pp 
compared to 2008 (23% of GDP).Public debt is becoming increasingly different to the central 
bank’s debt due to certain capital expenses being transferred from the budget to public companies 
(e.g. the Government dislocated a big share of road infrastructure projects from the budget by 
transforming the former Roads Fund into a Public Enterprise for State Roads), and due to the 
support in financing of small and medium-sized companies by the MBDP, whose debt rose from 
0.4% of GDP in 2009 to 2.2% in 2012 and reflects the use of lines of credit secured from the 
European Investment Bank.The public debt of state companies increased from 2.6% of GDP in 
2009 to 7.7% in 2014. In the future, it is important that spending and borrowing ofthe PDS to be 
estimated as part of fiscal risks and sustainability of the government’s debt. (Doemeland et al., 
2015) 
Graph 3. State debt and total public debt of the Republic of Macedonia 
 
Source: MF of RM. 
The maininstigator of debt growth is the central government’s primary deficit (2.5% on 
average in 2009-2014), as a result of fiscal measures and automatic stabilizers, the borrowing by 
state companies, the real interest rates (due to low inflation) etc..Only the growth of GDP went in 
the other direction but with smaller intensity compared to the pre-crisis period. 
State debt (mil. EUR) 
State debt (% of the GDP) 
Public debt (mil. EUR) 
Public debt (% of the GDP) 
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 The debt structure reveals some risks: a growing share of short-term debt and a high 
percentage of debt denominated in a foreign currency. A larger part of the debt is external, while 
the larger percentage of debt in foreign currency attracts a foreign currency risk, something that is 
important for a country like Macedonia with a de facto fixed exchange rate.A shock to the 
exchange rate can increase the liabilities expressed in domestic currency and the liquidity 
problems, with a negative effect on the country’s risk premium. 
  
4.2 Macedonia’s fiscal sustainability 
Despite its growth, the public debt is among the lowest in Europe (the average of SSE in 
2014 is 52.6% of GDP) and it is on a significantly lower level than the one established by the 
Maastricht criteria of 60% of GDP.Nevertheless, the accelerated dynamic of its growth at the 
start of the crisis (the debt doubled in the 2008-2015 period) presents a cause for concern, and 
imposes the need for higher caution in the management of public finances in order not to 
endanger their sustainability (a warning also given by the IMF and the World Bank). Also 
because of the awareness that in countries with lower incomes, the negative implications of 
public debt (consequences for macroeconomic stability, decreased capital earnings and financial 
limitations on the private sector) appear on a lower level of indebtedness. (Presbitero, 2010; 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). 
There aren’t many empirical analyses that touch on the problem of Macedonia’s fiscal 
sustainability. We can mention Tashevska (2015), Trenovski and Tashevska(Trenovski and 
Tashevska, 2015), Doemeland et al.(Doemeland et al.,2015), reports on Macedonia by the IMF. 
Below, we give a review of some of results of those analyses. 
The growth of budget revenues doesn’t fully follow the growth of budget expenditures i.e. 
they diverge, implying that their development doesn’t help the decline of the country’s 
indebtedness (Tashevska, 2015
9
). That study also shows that the growth of revenues causes a 
successive growth of the expenditures, implying that they aren’t used to narrow the budget 
deficit.  
A way to determine fiscal sustainability is by estimating the reaction of the primary budget 
balance when the level of debt changes. Trenovski and Tashevska (Trenovski and Tashevska, 
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There is a co-integration among budgetary revenues and budgetary expenditures which meets the condition of a so-
called “weak” alternative of fiscal sustainability. But the co-integration coefficient (b<1)shows the budget 
expenditures grow over-proportionately in relation to budget revenues.  
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2015) and Tashevska (2015) find a negative reaction of the primary balance during a short-term 
shock to the debt, and conclude that the indebtedness level has no deciding meaning when 
determining the fiscal position, in spite of the fact that during a longer period, the primary 
balance does react to the higher debt. But in order to prevent debt accumulation, a faster reaction 
by the primary balance is required. 
Most often, debt sustainability is analyzed by projecting its future trend. Economists from 
the World Bank (Doemeland et al., 2015) are projecting that the central government’s gross debt 
will stabilize at around 40% of GDP by 2019, while public debt will surpass 53% of GDP, within 
the current scenario which forecasts that the Government will implement the planned path of 
fiscal consolidation (decreasing fiscal deficits from 4.2% in 2014 to 2.9% by 2017), stated in the 
Medium-term Fiscal Framework 2015-2017. This borrowing trend is confirmed by reports from 
the IMF, where the last one (IMF, 2015) predicts that the general government’s debt will reach 
45% of the GDP by 2020, while the total public debt will be 54% of GDP (graph 4).  
The Government of the Republic of Macedonia (2015) predicts the public debt in 2018 to 
reach 52.4% of GDP, while state debt 41.5%, which is similar to the basic scenario in 
Tashevska’s projections (2015)10. The projected fiscal trend mainly comes from the high primary 
deficit, and is partially neutralized by the favorable perspectives of growth. The total public debt 
will increase rapidly, primarily due to higherspending by state companies.
11
 A weaker GDP 
growth will negatively impact the share of debt through the lower denominator (nominal GDP) 
and with the worsening of the budget balance as a result of the automatic stabilizers which can 
cause for the debt to endanger the threshold of 60% of GDP. The same can occur if there is no 
success in the implementation of fiscal consolidation, while the primary balance maintains a level 
of around -3%, or if all investment projects are implemented, without changes to the pension 
policy. It can be concluded that all debt projections point to a growing trend and caution in 
further management of public finances. (Doemeland et al., 2015; IMF,2015; Tashevska, 2015) 
Graph 4. Projections on the debt’s high dynamic (% of the GDP) 
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Tashevska (2015), with the aid of stochastic simulations of the central bank’s debt, based on the methodology by 
Garcia and Rigobon (Garcia and Rigobon, 2004), estimates a debt growth of over 40% of GDP by the end of 2017. 
11
The debt of state companies is predicted to rise to 14.4% by 2019 (Doemeland et al., 2015) 
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Source: IMF (2015); (Doemeland et al., 2015), Government of the Republic of Macedonia (2015) 
The accelerated pre-crisis growth dynamic of public debt imposes the need for a good 
medium-term fiscal strategy of consolidation. In order to secure debt sustainability, the central 
bank’s primary deficit should be gradually reduced, primarily to stabilize the debt, and then to 
build fiscal buffers. According to the IMF’s estimates,in order to stabilize the debt, it is necessary 
to reduce the central bank’s primary deficit of around 1.6% of GDP(IMF, 2015). 
The Government predicted fiscal consolidation by tightening the budget deficit to -2.6% in 
2018. (Government of RM, 2015), and fiscal rules that should come into force from 1 January 
2017, with a budget deficit ceiling of3% of GDP and public debt ceiling of 60% of GDP. 
Nevertheless, according to the IMF (2015), an even lower debt limit would help Macedonia 
create a sufficient fiscal space in order to respond to future challenges from macroeconomic 
shocks and from medium-term pressures associated with an aging population,while 




Macedonia’s public debt is among the lowest in Europe (by the end of 2013, the state debt 
was 34,2 % of GDP, while the total public debt 40.5% of GDP). While on a moderate level, the 
pre-crisis accelerated dynamic of debt growth attracts the need for a good medium-term fiscal 
strategy of conciliation. The smaller threshold of debt tolerance of countries with lower wages 
should be taken into account. The risk of non-payment of debts has a tendency to grow along 
with the debt, however, which level of computability with fiscal sustainability is acceptable 
remains a matter of estimation. Nevertheless, the empirical analyses of developing markets show 
that countries can enter the debt crisis even if the debt is surprisingly low. In 55% of countries 
State debt (IMF) 
Debt of the Central Government 
(WB) 
Public debt (Government of the 
RM) 
Public debt (IMF) 
Public debt (WB) 
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with medium income, when not complying with debt liabilities, their public debt was under 60% 
of GDP; and in 35% was less than 40% (Doemeland et al., 2015). 
Based on our analysis, we can make the following recommendations for an economic 
policy in Macedonia:  
- While the level of debt is not very high, measures of gradual fiscal consolidation are required, 
in order for a fiscal space to be created. It is recommendable that each over-performance of 
revenue i.e. accrual surplus, to be used to lower public debt. To ensure debt sustainability, the 
primary deficit should gradually decrease, in order to stabilize the debt, and then build fiscal 
buffers; 
- The consolidation would be best achieved by cutting current expenditures, since they have 
smaller multiplicative effects and a smaller negative effect on economic growth (see Trenovski, 
2013). According to the WB (2016), reforming the amount and targeting the pensions and 
social benefits is crucial for an effective medium-term fiscal consolidation. Priorities should be 
established, in terms of capital expenditures, while public investments should be directed 
toward large infrastructural projects (roads, modernizing the railroads, gasification), which 
significantly lowers business costs, and toward research, development and education, which 
encourages growth; 
- The low taxation level attracts investments and creates jobs. Since the maintaining of low and 
flat tax is the Government’s strategic decision, the increase of budget revenue can be achieved 
by creating a fiscal policy for structural and tax reformation:the expansion of the tax base and 
its ambit, as well as improving the efficiency of tax collection (further decrease of the grey 
economy and its officialisation/covered by tax regulations); 
- Good coordination between fiscal and monetary policy is needed. Fiscal policy cannot achieve 
the required goals without the support by the monetary policy; but when determining the course 
of action and the measures taken, the monetary aggregates should also be taken into account; 
- Since the largest share of the debt is in foreign currency and abroad, in order to maintain the 
value of the denar, reforms are needed to stimulate exports, which is a key factor for improving 
the growth dynamics, and also carries a larger inflow of foreign currency;  
- The expectations of economic subjects should be heeded, because if they expect larger fiscal 
contraction in the future (or perceive the fiscal policies are unsustainable in the long term) as a 
13 
result of today’s increased public expenditures, they will react by saving more and investing 
less; 
- The sustainable level of debt also depends on the succesful implementation of more effective 
macroeconomic policies and strucutral reforms that encourage economic growth, a more fiscal 
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